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LEGAL REMEDIAL ALTERNATIVES FOR




"Assault" and "abuse," although often legally indistinguish-
able, have quite different connotations. Texas law has long defined
assault as a criminal act without reference to the circumstances
surrounding it. 1 The definition of abuse, on the other hand, incor-
porates surrounding circumstances. Texas law identifies abuse as
violence used by one person against another who stands in a spe-
cial relationship to that person. Thus, the feature that distin-
guishes abuse from assault is the relationship between the victim
and the assailant. Wife abuse, husband abuse, child abuse, and
abuse of the elderly are the most visible and recognized types of
abuse.2
Although the terms "wife," "husband," and "spouse" indicate
a formal, legal relationship between cohabitants, any useful discus-
sion of abuse extends to any persons living together in an arrange-
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, BA., Trinity Uni-
versity, J.D., LL.M., Southern Methodist University.
t The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the National Clearinghouse on
Domestic Violence and Ms. Lisa Lerman, former staff attorney for the Center for Women
Policy Studies, for providing invaluable resource material and Associate Dean Walter W.
Steele, Jr., of the Southern Methodist University School of Law, for editorial assistance and
guidance.
1. TFX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01-.08 (Vernon 1974).
2. Child abuse and elderly abuse are, respectively, the first and latest forms of abuse
to have produced public reaction. Much has been done in formulating legal responses to
child abuse. See, e.g., Tx. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon 1974). Far less has been ac-
complished in preventing abuse of the elderly.
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ment that removes them from the traditional concept of criminal
assault by one stranger on another. In Texas, family violence has
been defined in the newly enacted Family Protection Act as "the
intentional use or threat of physical force by a member of a family
or household against another member of the family or house-
hold . . . ."s This definition realistically avoids the term "wife-
beating" as too simplistic a description of abusive relationships.
Instead, the Act encompasses the presently recognized range of as-
saultive conduct within both formal and informal family units.
B. Focus and Methodology
Of the various kinds of abuse described, spouse abuse has re-
ceived the least attention in relation to its frequency. Therefore,
this study and the recommendations made in it address only abuse
between adult cohabitants of similar ages. For the purpose of this
study, the sex of the victim will play no distinguishing role. Wife
abuse is, of course, considerably more common than husband
abuse,4 but either brand of assault occurs with enough frequency
to warrant consideration.
5
In discussing abuse, commentators tend to stress the evolution
of social attitudes from the righteous defense of a husband's right
to beat his wife to present concern for a social problem of consider-
able magnitude.' However, this study will focus on the civil and
criminal legal alternatives available in Texas for dealing with
abuse and will consider how current and proposed systems may
protect victims more effectively and deter abusers.
This study will rely on empirical studies because such observa-
tions can reveal the direction legal systems should take and
pinpoint the flaws and shortcomings in present legal responses to
abuse. Although some of these observations merely acknowledge
apparently irremediable systemic deficiencies, on the whole they
3. Tsx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.01(b)(2) (Vernon 1979).
4. Domestic Violence and Legislation with Respect to Domestic Violence: Hearings
on S. 1728 Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm.
on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978).
5. Straus, Wife Beating: How Common and Why?, 2 VICrMOLOoy 443, 447-48 (1978).
6. See, e.g., Straus, supra note 5, at 444; Taub, Ex Parte Proceedings in Domestic
Violence Situations: Alternative Frameworks for Constitutional Scrutiny, 9 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 95, 97 (1980); Comment, Spouse Abuse: A Novel Remedy for a Historic Problem, 84
DICK. L. REv. 147, 150 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Spouse Abuse]; Comment,
Wife Beating: Law and Society Confront the Castle Door, 15 GONz. L. REv. 171, 173
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Wife Beating].
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form the essential background for possible reform.
C. The Scope of Abuse
The difficulty of assessing the extent of spouse abuse increases
the difficulty of finding an effective legal remedy. Abuse, like rape,
is far less likely to be reported than other crimes.7 Any reported
statistical incidence rate probably represents only a fraction of the
actual number of abuse cases. In addition, spouse abuse is hard to
define in any meaningful statistical manner because of the variety
of forms it takes. Some social scientists have established a violence
scale for measuring more accurately the kinds and degrees of abuse
reported.8 This is an important methodological advance, although
inaccuracies in reporting continue to plague data collection con-
cerning abuse.
Law enforcement agencies are probably the most common
sources of information about abuse. Unfortunately, there is no uni-
form reporting system for gathering even fundamental information
about abuse. Those reports which are taken are often colored by
the police officer's perception of the problem and the lack of a
clear-cut definition of abusive conduct. Pushing, shoving, slapping,
and similar acts may be abuse to one officer and normal communi-
cation to another. Medical service agencies, another potential
source of information, are not required to report suspected spouse
abuse as they are child abuse. However, even if that data were
available, Texas has no central information gathering agency. In
spite of the failure to document incidents of abuse adequately, the
available information shows a need for immediate action. The lack
of an adequate information gathering system itself suggests the
monumental proportions of the problem.'
7. Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 174.
8. Straus, supra note 5, at 448.
9. One of the most widely quoted studies on the incidence of abuse concluded from a
sample of 2,143 couples that approximately 1.8 million American wives are abused by their
husbands on a yearly basis. Id. at 445. For purposes of this study, only acts carrying a high
risk of serious injury to the victim were considered. When one takes into account the under-
reporting tendencies in this kind of study, statisticians estimate that fifty or sixty percent of
all couples experience some level of abuse, rather than the twenty-eight percent who re-
ported it. Id. at 447. If this estimate is correct, approximately twelve million wives can ex-
pect to experience abuse from their husbands. Other studies have estimated that one-third
to one-half of married women have been subjected to spousal violence. Taub, supra note 6,
at 95. Another researcher estimated that from one million to twenty-eight million women
are battered. Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 174. These estimates suggest that
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The unavailability or unreliability of statistics on the inci-
dence of spouse abuse in Texas is largely due to a historical indif-
ference to abuse as a major social concern. It is clear, however, that
the number of cases of spouse abuse in Texas alone may be in the
millions.
II. THE NATURE OF SPOUSE ABUSE
Before turning to a discussion of the three broad categories of
legal remedies for abuse and their respective levels of adequacy,
one must have some understanding of the circumstances of abuse.
To combat abuse, one must appreciate its character, participants,
and impact.
A. Violent Abuse
Statistics from the 1978 Uniform Crime Reports for reported
murders and non-negligent homicides in which a husband or wife
was the victim indicate that 4.3 % of the men killed nationally were
killed by their wives. 10 For the same year, 5.6% of the women
killed died at the hands of their husbands.1" These percentages
mean that approximately 804 husbands were killed by their wives
and 1047 wives by their husbands.1 2 In all, over 1850 spouses' were
killed by their partners.13
The incidence of spousal homicide in Texas is difficult to de-
termine because of the way statistics are reported, but some fairly
accurate guesswork may be attempted. In 1978, 1853 murders and
non-negligent manslaughter crimes were reported in Texas.14 An
extrapolation of national percentages indicates that approximately
183 people were killed by their mates in Texas during 1978.15 The
abuse is dangerously close to being the rule rather than the exception.
10. CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE STATISTIcs-19S0, at 312 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK-1980].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. See also Fields, Representing Battered Wives, Or What to Do Until the Police
Arrive, 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4025, 4027 (Apr. 5, 1977).
14. SOURCEBooK-1980, supra note 10, at 306.
15. Id. at 312. In 1977, the Texas Department of Public Safety extracted its own data
of crime in Texas before the information was further distilled for inclusion in the national
statistics. See TEx. DEP'T PUS. SAFETY, CRIME IN TEXAS (1977). Those figures more accu-
rately reflect the scope of spousal homicide in Texas. A total of 159 homicides occurred
involving husbands and wives. Id. at 17. Another 48 involved common-law marriages, and 14
former spouses died. Id. Boyfriends and girlfriends accounted for an additional 21 deaths.
[Vol. 20:12791282
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expansion of the definition of "spouse" to more realistic parame-
ters would increase dramatically the number of people included.
These deaths-the most concrete evidence of spousal
abuse-demonstrate the significance of the problem. Clearly, most
of the deaths do not occur as the result of the first abusive epi-
sode.16 One may logically assume that each death represents the
culmination of many assaults.
Spousal assault is far more common than spousal homicide. In
1969, Mulvihill and Tumin examined the records of nearly 1500
aggravated assaults for, among other factors, the personal relation-
ship between the victim and offender.17 Aggravated assaults be-
tween husbands and wives, whether the marriage was formal or
common law, accounted for 9.4% of the total, and an additional
2.9% were attributed to those in a relationship defined as "par-
amour."1 8 Not surprisingly, the same study revealed that 26.3% of
all aggravated assaults occurred in the home, an environment sur-
passed only by the street as the scene of such assaults.10
In 1978, police reported aggravated assaults numbering 28,475
in Texas20 and 534,592 nationally.,1 The figures of Mulvihill and
Tumin, when applied to these reported offenses, indicate that as
many as 3787 aggravated assaults between spouses or cohabitants
could have occurred in Texas during the same year, and as many
as 71,233 nationally for that period.22
One must remember that these figures, as high as they are,
reflect only those offenses known to police and may not always re-
flect the seriousness of the assault. Since underreporting is com-
mon in spouse abuse,23 figures on aggravated assault between
mates may be highly inaccurate.24
Id. Altogether, 242 people were killed by someone with whom they had experienced tie3 of
affection or marriage at some time. Id.
16. Taub, supra note 6, at 96; Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 156.
17. CmminAL JusT7cE CENm_, U.S. DEP'T op JusnCF, SouC nooK o Ciuma. Jus-
TICE SrATncs-1973, at 197 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sotmc~xooK-1973j.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 196.
20. SouRcEsooK-1980, supra note 10, at 306.
21. Id. at 308.
22. Sou cEBooK-1973, supra note 17, at 197.
23. Straus, supra note 5, at 447.
24. A recent and alarming study of spousal assaults in Kentucky indicates that 4.1%
of the married women in that state experienced severe abuse during the 12 months preced-
ing the study. Over 33,000 wives or cohabitating partners experienced assault that would




The most common form of nonviolent abuse is verbal. Purely
verbal abuse, without any element of threat or incitement to a
breach of the peace, cannot be regulated without conflict with first
amendment protections.25 The Texas Penal Code specifically ex-
cludes as justifiable the use of force in response to verbal provoca-
tion alone.28 Although verbal abuse is not subject to civil or crimi-
nal sanctions, such verbal abuse nevertheless may lead to physical
abuse.
A more tangible form of nonviolent abuse involves interfer-
ence with property rights of the victim. This kind of abuse can
literally strip away the financial resources of the victim, effectively
bar costly legal remedies, and break down the victim's desire to
pursue any action against the abuser. Interference with property
rights can range from squandering community income to destruc-
tion of property.
C. The Profile of Abusive Spouses
A character profile of potential abusers is invaluable in assur-
ing that these people and their victims will be identified and
steered toward the legal resources created to assist them. Again,
the contradictory data available suggest the need for additional
information.
Dr. F.G. Bolton, Jr., a social scientist who has done considera-
ble work in the field of spouse abuse, characterizes abusive families
as of predominately lower socioeconomic status.2 7 Dr. Bolton's the-
ory of economic factors as a dominant feature of violent families is,
however, contradicted by other researchers, who contend that
spouse abuse transcends class and ethnic barriers, with profession-
als contributing as much to the problem as unskilled workers.25
One recent study reveals that a simple characterization of
Kentucky women are estimated to have been severely abused at some time. M. SCIXULMAN, A
SURVEY OF SPousAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN KENTUCKY 13-15 (1979).
25. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446-49 (1969) (holding Ohio Criminal Syn.
dicalism Act unconstitutional on first amendment grounds because it failed to distinguish
between mere inflammatory speech and incitement of imminent lawless acts),
26. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(b)(1) (Vernon 1974).
27. Bolton, The Domestic Violence Continuum: A Pressing Need for Legal Inter-
vention, 66 WOMEN LAW. J. 11, 13 (1980).
28. Hamlin, The Nature and Extent of Spouse Assault, 1978 VICTIM ADVOC. 10, 14;
Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 149.
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abusers is impossible.29 Nonwhites, urban families, and younger
families experienced spousal violence more often than other
groups, but all classes, races, and backgrounds were represented.30
Eleven percent of the women surveyed from lower income groups
reported some violent incident during the past twelve months.-3
Ten percent of women with family incomes between $15,000 and
$24,999, and eight percent of women with family income of $25,000
or more, reported such incidents.3 2 These figures show little corre-
lation between income and violence. Education levels produced
even more surprising results. The same study indicated that fewer
acts of spousal violence occurred in families in which the husband
had an eighth grade education or less than in those families in
which the husband had finished high school or college.-"
If these characterizations reflect the true breadth of spouse
abuse, no quick solution will emerge from concentration on either
free urban legal services or formalized, expensive equitable proce-
dures. Rather, the legal alternatives must reflect the diversity of
the people involved.
D. Characteristics of Spouse Abuse
Factors frequently present in abuse situations also provide
guidance for legal solutions. The first of these factors is that an
incident of domestic violence is unlikely to be reported to police.-
The refusal to report abuse may indicate a lack of confidence or
trust in the ability of the police to handle the situation, a reluc-




33. Id. Stereotypical conceptions about spouse abusers seem inaccurate in light of
these results. The study concluded:
The collective portrait of the abusive and violence.prone family is hardly distin-
guishable from the profile of the average family on the street. While there is some
tendency for these families to be urban, young, and nonwhite, violence-prone fam-
lies are found across the broad social spectrum-middle clas and lower clam,
nonwhite and white, urban and rural.
Id. at 18.
34. Id. at 36. Kentucky abuse victims who indicated a very high incidence rate re-
vealed that only 9% of the incidents were reported to police. Nonwhite and lower-income
victims filed reports more than twice as often as other victims surveyed, a fact that might
explain the stereotypical view of the likelihood of abuse in those claase Since the Kentucky
survey dealt only with abused women, there is no indication of how many abused males fail
to report abuse, but the figure may well exceed that of the nonreporting females. Id.
1983] 1285
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tance to invoke the sanctions of the criminal justice system, or a
general desire to work out the matter within the family.
Another salient factor is the abuse of alcohol. Some research-
ers have estimated that from forty to ninety-five percent of abuse
incidents involve alcohol. 5 A recent study of police response to
abuse calls indicates that the police perceive alcohol as an impor-
tant element in their decision to arrest.38 Although alcohol has not
been conclusively shown to be a primary contributor to physical
abuse, sufficient evidence exists to indicate its importance. More
study of the connection between alcohol and spousal violence is
therefore essential.
A final and alarming observation about abuse is that it seems
more likely to occur in families in which the victim was raised by
abusive parents.37 In one study, women recalling family violence
towards their own mothers were themselves victims more often
than women whose fathers rarely or never acted violently toward
their mothers by a ratio of twenty-eight percent to seven percent.38
E. The Societal Impact of Abuse
An often overlooked aspect of abuse is its economic cost. Soci-
etal response to abuse requires expensive services. In the legal sys-
tem alone, law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, private attor-
neys, civil and criminal courts, courts of appeal, and the
corresponding probation, parole, and clerical personnel attached to
the system have become involved, often unwillingly, in the ramifi-
cations of abuse.
For instance, consider the economic impact of a relatively un-
complicated assault case. Police officers are called from other du-
ties and, because of the danger that domestic calls present, two
officers are required to respond. The offender, if arrested, must be
jailed at public expense. A public prosecutor must prepare and
possibly try the case. If any judicial disposition is made, additional
administrative expenses are incurred by the probation office, cor-
rection facility, or the court. Civil actions also create judicial costs,
although the parties usually bear more of the expense. Divorce ac-
35. Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 176.
36. Berk & Loseke, "Handling" Family Violence: Situational Determinants of Po-
lice Arrest in Domestic Disturbances, 15 L. & Soc'y REv. 317, 339 (1981).
37. M. SCHULMAN, supra note 24, at 29; Taub, supra note 6, at 96; Comment, Wife
Beating, supra note 6, at 177.
38. M. SCHULMAN, supra note 24, at 29.
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SPOUSE ABUSE
tions, tort claims, custody hearings, or simple anxiety take their
toll, as do losses of property or expendable income.
Spousal assault will not be as expensive to remedy as it is to
tolerate. Abuse is not a minor inconvenience for those unfortunate
enough to experience it: it is a monstrous social ill that shows
every sign of spreading: Many states have taken steps to combat
this problem, but no simple unilateral legislative approach will
overcome this Hydra. Texas has delayed responding to this prob-
lem, and much remains to be done.
III. LEGAL INTERVENTION ALTERNATIVES
Currently, the broad categories of legal alternatives available
to the abused spouse are criminal prosecution, civil remedies, and
protective orders-a newly formed equitable device. The criminal
justice alternatives include substantive and procedural criminal
law designed for or adapted to abuse situations,s" as well as the
intervention of the police,' "prosecutors,41 and courts' 2 in applying
these laws and sanctions.
A. Civil Actions
No single approach to civil redress can provide a complete so-
lution to spousal abuse. On the contrary, procedural, substantive,
and practical problems make each approach inadequate in assist-
ing some class of litigants. Yet, taken as a whole, the spectrum of
civil alternatives offers important opportunities to protect and
compensate the victim.
1. Peace Bonds. Peace bonds have often been issued in cases
of family violence as an inexpensive and readily available deter-
rent.43 Although a bond is essentially criminal in nature," the par-
ties and even the court issuing the bond may consider it as a civil
remedy because there is no direct criminal sanction for its viola-
39. Refer to notes 89-109 infra and accompanying text.
40. Refer to notes 110-39 infra and accompanying text.
41. Refer to notes 140-43 infra and accompanying text.
42. Refer to notes 144.51 infra and accompanying text.
43. If the accused is required to post bond, he, as opposed to the victim, must pay the
cost of the proceeding. T1x CODE Carl Paom. ANN. art. 7.14 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1982-
1983). The victim need only prove that there is just reason to believe that the threat will be
carried out. Id. art. 7.03.
44. See id. arts. 7.01-.17 (procedure for obtaining and enforcing peace bonds).
1983] 1287
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tion, 5 and because the device is commonly employed prior to the
commission of a violent criminal act.
4
6
As a practical matter, any remedy in the field of spousal abuse
must be available quickly and inexpensively. Its availability must
be widely known, and it must address the needs of the spouse re-
quiring abuse protection. It is just this availability that has meta-
morphosed the peace bond into a common protective device for
spousal assault.
Because peace bonds are usually administered by justice
courts,47 they are easily accessible.4 8 The geographical distribution
of such courts makes them the most convenient forum for judicial
intervention. 49 In addition, the informality associated with the jus-
tice court encourages pro se filing and prosecution of petitions with
minimal court costs. The resulting frequency of peace bonds as a
violence control device insures that victims will know of the exis-
tence of this remedy and will seek it out in time of need.
Despite the availability of peace bonds, their effectiveness in
deterring spousal assault is questionable. A peace bond is available
as an alternative only when the spouse has threatened violence but
has not actually acted upon the threat. Undoubtedly, many
spousal assaults begin with threats, but a large number begin with
physical contact. A peace bond is an inappropriate remedy for past
assaultive episodes. Addressing this situation, Texas law specifies
that if evidence presented at a peace bond hearing indicates that
the accused has actually committed a crime, he shall be tried for
that crime. 1 The bond may be forfeited to the state if its condi-
tions are violated. Because the funds used to post the bond proba-
bly come from community property, the victim is essentially pay-
45. Id. arts. 7.13, 7.17. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-6669 (1945).
46. When a peace bond issues, the accused is required to "keep the peace toward the
person threatened or about to be injured .... ." TEX. CODE CrM. PROC. ANN. art. 7.03
(Vernon 1977).
47. Article 7.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires a magistrate to issue
a warrant for the arrest of a person accused of threatening an offense against the person or
property of another whenever the magistrate is informed upon oath of the threatened crime.
Id. art. 7.01. This provision is mandatory upon any magistrate to whom sworn application is
made. Id. However, custom has relegated this function almost exclusively to the justice
court. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 537 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
48. Each county in Texas must have no fewer than four precincts, each with its own
justice of the peace. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2351, § 1 (Vernon 1971).
49. See generally id. §§ 1, 7 (authorization to establish courts).
50. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7.03 (Vernon 1977).
51. Id. art. 7.13.
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ing a portion of the abuser's fine. Similarly, if the abuser is unable
to post bond and is incarcerated, the potential victim must often
suffer the loss of the abuser's income as well as face the unhappy
prospect of the angered abuser's eventual release.
In spite of the difficulties inherent in the peace bond proce-
dure and pattern of sanctions, the peace bond remains somewhat
effective as a deterrent. The efficacy of any legal protection de-
pends in large part upon its ability to shape behavior, and in this
respect the peace bond has built an admirable record upon a weak
foundation. Simply stated, it is the belief of the victim and the
abuser in the procedure that makes it work. While hardly an im-
posing body in the context of the entire legal system, the justice
court may well represent the only visible representative of social
order with which the parties have been involved. Therefore, one
cannot underestimate the effectiveness of such orders as practical
and useful tools in deterring domestic violence, especially when di-
vorce is not a desirable alternative.
2. Divorce. Divorce has been termed "[t]he most effective
civil remedy" for spouse abuse 2 and is often a logical response for
a victim. But it is not always the remedy chosen.
In addition to the natural reluctance many feel toward divorce
over what may be perceived as a temporary, sporadic, or relatively
minor marital problem, victims avoid divorce for more practical
reasons. These concerns include the expense of the proceedings,
the lack of financial support, the unavailability of child care or
shelter facilities, religious restrictions, and the fear of reprisal."
52. Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 187.
53. As one commentator stated:
[I]t is unreasonable to expect all women to seek divorce of their abusers. Some
may believe it will be possible to control the violence and remain together;, some
may be opposed to divorce for religious reasons; and others may simply need
breathing space to determine what they will ultimately do.
Taub, supra note 6, at 97-98. See also M. SCHULMAN, supra note 24, at 29; Comment, Wife
Beating, supra note 6, at 177.
54. Unlike many states, Texas does not require fault grounds for divorce, Tex. FAm.
CODE ANN. § 3.01 (Vernon 1975), thereby affording an option of privacy to the abuser and
victim. In states requiring fault grounds, a spouse may endure considerable abuse before
suit can be filed. Taub, supra note 6, at 99; Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 157.
One assaultive incident may be insufficient to establish cruelty, and requiring a pattern of
abuse increases the danger to the victim. Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 157. For
states requiring fault grounds, see Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 187-88; Com-




Financial inability is the major obstacle to divorce proceedings
for perhaps most victims. Financial responsibility for children,
community debts, or responsibility for maintaining community
property may make divorce literally impossible regardless of the
victim's willingness to divorce. 5 Attorneys usually charge fees
based upon the professional effort expended and the complexity of
the proceedings. A simple, uncontested divorce may be within the
means of many, but the expense of restraining orders, counseling,
investigations, and litigation often place the most effective aspects
of divorce beyond the reach of victims of spouse abuse.
If the victim does seek a divorce, the abused spouse will usu-
ally attempt to have temporary orders entered during the pen-
dency of the divorce proceeding. A temporary order may be issued
to prevent physical or mental abuse of the spouse or children 0 and
destruction or concealment of property.57 Additionally, upon appli-
cation for a temporary injunction and after notice and a hearing,""
a court may order support payments or division of property, or
may give one party exclusive possession of the family residence.,,
Additionally, the court may order counseling." Unfortunately,
the Texas statute provides such counseling solely for the purpose
of determining whether reconciliation is possible.6 1 While this usu-
ally may be desirable, reconciliation is often undesirable in a fam-
ily unit that has experienced abuse. Expansion of the statute to
make counseling available, not for the sole purpose of reuniting the
couple, but also to quantify and qualify the significance of the
abuse involved, would be of greater benefit to victims.
Because they have such breadth of application, temporary or-
ders or injunctions may prove especially effective in protecting a
55. Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 189-90.
56. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(a)(1)-(5) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
57. Id. § 3.58 (a)(6)-(10).
58. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 424, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2348 (Vernon)
(amending TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)) (to be recodified at
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(c)). Prior to the 1983 amendments to the Family Code, these
remedies were available to applicants through a temporary restraining order without notice
or hearing. Id. While the amendments decrease the breadth of the temporary restraining
order, they do have the salutary effect of decreasing the requirements for granting an order.
Id. (amending TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(e) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)) (to be recodified
at TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 3.58(d)).
59. Id. (amending TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)) (to be
recodified at Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58 (c)).
60. Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.54(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
61. Id. § 3.54(b).
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spouse seeking a divorce in an abuse case. These orders and in-
junctions share a common denominator upon which their effective-
ness turns: the court must be obeyed. A respondent who violates
a temporary order or injunction may be held in contempt.0 2 How-
ever, the courts' reluctance to impose contempt may seriously un-
dermine the victim's confidence in the protection seemingly offered
by divorce. Judges often hesitate to incarcerate or fine a violator
if he promises to comply with the order in the future. In cases of
subsequent disobedience, judges may impose sanctions, but proba-
bly not lengthy jail terms or large fines. Facilities and court time
simply do not permit extensive imposition of sanctions.
In addition to the administrative burden of punishing every
violation of a civil order, there are other justifications for the reluc-
tance to impose sanctions. If a spouse violating a civil order is in-
carcerated, he will be unable to work and earn the money needed
for support payments or his own maintenance. This loss of employ-
ment would only harm the abused spouse by diminishing the com-
munity estate. Ordering the payment of the victim's attorney's fees
or assessing a fine would have a similar effect.
Some have suggested that this situation be remedied by al-
lowing warrantless arrests for violation of injunctive orders. This
does not, however, remove the obstacles to law enforcement.4
Even if such arrests were permitted, courts would avoid fining or
imprisoning first-time violators of orders, regardless of the severity
of the violation, unless the court were convinced that the well-be-
ing of both the victim and the abuser would be served best by pun-
ishment. This assurance is frequently nonexistent. The most pro-
62. Ex parte Valdez, 521 SAV.2d 724, 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975,
no writ).
63. Trent, Wife Beating: A Psycho-Legal Analysis, 65 WomE LAw. J. 9, 15 (1979).
64. A warrantless arrest based upon an alleged violation of an injunction differs con-
siderably from an allegation of violation of a penal statute. In the case of the latter, the
officer has a statutory provision against which to measure the actor's conduct, and, hope-
fully, training and experience in dealing with the factors constituting probable cause to be-
lieve a violation of the statute has occurred. Arrest based upon a court order presupposes
the validity of the order and the proper interpretation of the order by the police officer. In
neither of these determinations is the officer qualified by education or experience. Finally, it
must be remembered that warrantless arrests for misdemeanors are strictly limited in
Texas. See Tax. CODE CraM. PROc. ANN. arts. 14.01-.06 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1982-1933).
The punishment range for criminal contempt is similar to that of a misdemeanor offense.
Compare Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1911a (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (penalties for con-




ductive course for abused spouses may be to continue to obtain the
most stringent and specific protection possible from temporary or-
ders, but to keep in mind that they may need to resort to some
process other than contempt to punish continued abuse.
3. Tort Actions. No one would seriously challenge the appli-
cation of tort law to an assault committed upon a person by a
stranger. But serious obstacles, often amounting to an absolute
bar, arise when the parties are husband and wife. To understand
denial of the tort remedy to an abused spouse, one must recall the
legal relationship of husband and wife prior to 1844: the marriage
merged the legal identity of the wife into that of the husband, and
the parties became one.6 5 This unity-of-marriage fiction swallowed
the individual property rights of the wife, including the right to a
cause of action. Since a person cannot sue himself, it followed logi-
cally that the wife, sharing the legal identity of the husband, could
not sue her spouse."
All American jurisdictions passed the Married Women's Acts,
sometimes known as the Emancipation Acts, during the middle of
the nineteenth century.67 These statutes were intended to recog-
nize the property of each spouse and insure the right of the woman
to sue and be sued in her own name for causes of action that might
accrue to her individually. However, even after passage of the
Married Women's Acts, a vestige of this historical interspousal re-
lationship remained. Based squarely upon the unity-of-marriage
fiction, interspousal tort immunity barred a tort action, even for
intentional torts, against a spouse,69 regardless of whether the suit
was brought during or after marriage.70 In contravention of the in-
tended result of the Married Women's Acts, interspousal tort im-
munity persists in some jurisdictions today. 1
65. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971).
66. Id.
67. Id; Comment, The Battered Wife-The Legal System Attempts to Help, 48 U.
CIN. L. REv. 419, 421 (1979).
68. Comment, supra note 67, at 421.
69. Id. at 420-24.
70. W. PROSSER, supra note 65, § 122.
71. Id. A variety of justifications have been propounded for the continuance of the
immunity. Preservation of the harmony of the home was often cited as a reason to bar
actions. Some believed that spurious law suits would result, or that collusive suits would be
brought to defraud insurance carriers. Still others felt that other remedies, like divorce or
criminal prosecution, were available to the injured spouse, and critics worried that the
tortfeasor might share in the proceeds of any insurance recovery awarded for the injury.
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Texas adopted interspousal tort immunity in 1886 with the
decision of the supreme court in Nickerson v. Nickerson." The
Nickerson immunity, typifying the doctrine, prevented suits
brought during or after the marriage by a wife against her husband
in tort, whether committed negligently or intentionally." Nicker-
son and subsequent Texas cases advanced three basic grounds for
adoption of the immunity: disruption of marital tranquility, the
adequacy of other forms of relief, and the problems presented by a
wife recovering a judgment from community assets.7 '
Though widely criticized, interspousal tort immunity remained
the law in Texas until 1977 when the Supreme Court of Texas de-
cided Bounds v. Caudle.7 5 In Bounds, the husband had committed
an intentional tort against his wife, causing her death.7 0 The chil-
dren of the deceased wife brought suit against the husband/assail-
ant for wrongful death, and they ultimately prevailed in spite of
the Nickerson rule. In deciding Bounds, the court did not com-
pletely overturn tort immunity but merely abrogated the immunity
for intentional torts.7 However, since an abused spouse suffers pri-
marily from intentional assault, Bounds provides a useful remedy.
The award of community property to satisfy a tort judgment
remains a potentially significant obstacle to interspousal litigation.
On the most basic level, the problem may be reduced to two ques-
tions: (1) whether a tortfeasor should pay for his wrongdoing with
funds in which the victim already has a community interest, and
(2) once the judgment is paid, whether a tortfeasor should be able
to share that judgment because it is community in nature.7 8 Recent
statutory changes arguably have relieved this concern, 70 but no in-
while all of these concerns are legitimate in the proper context, they were merely make-
weight for continuing an immunity doctrine that patently defies public policy and has done
so for over a hundred years. See id.
72. 65 Tex. 281, 283 (1886).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 283-84; Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
75. 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
76. Id. at 927.
77. Id.
78. For a good discussion of this problem, see generally Comment, Interspousal Tort
Immunity, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 291 (1978).
79. See Tm. FAm. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon 1975) (specifying that all community
property is subject to liability for torts committed by either spouse during the marriage).
This provision sets up the first serious obstacle to the effective application of Bounds. If a
spouse brings suit against an abuser, the judgment will be paid, if at all, from the nonex-
empt assets of the community. In other words, the abuse victim may bear the expense of
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terpretive decisions permit precise outcome prediction in an inter-
spousal tort suit.80
Interspousal tort actions have not become commonplace since
Bounds,81 but their potential as a private compensatory mecha-
nism remains intact. This alternative should not be overlooked
simply because it lacks familiarity.
4. Victim Compensation Legislation. Private compensation
systems are no longer the only available means of relief in Texas
for some victims. In 1979, the Texas Legislature passed the Crime
Victims Compensation Act 2 to provide relief for those suffering a
financial loss due to injury or death caused by criminal acts.8 3 The
Act was established to insure compensation of victims of violent
crime from a fund established by the legislature and administered
by the Crime Victims Compensation Division of the Industrial Ac-
cident Board."4
The Crime Victims Compensation Act does not apply to most
spouse abuse cases because denial of an application made under
the Act is automatic if "the victim resided in the same household
as the offender or his or her accomplice." 85 This language clearly
evidences the legislative attitude that abuse victims differ from
other crime victims. Whether this attitude is related to the appar-
ent willingness of the abused spouse to continue the relationship or
to concerns about the use made of any award is unclear. For those
abuse victims who are separated or divorced at the time of the as-
sault, a remedy under the Act remains a possibility.
The funding scheme for a public compensation act specifically
targeted for abuse victims might imitate the present Crime Victims
one-half of the judgment for the tortfeasor's conduct.
80. It is ironic that Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886), also suggests a ration-
ale for avoiding sharing the tort judgment. In Nickerson, the injured spouse could not re-
cover from the joint tortfeasor spouse because of his immunity but was granted a recovery
against a third-party joint tortfeasor. The court held the recovered damages were the sepa-
rate property of the injured spouse, since allowing the husband to share in the judgment
would reward him for his part in the tort. Id. at 285. This "forfeiture exception" to the
general rule that such recoveries would be community property has remained, and is essen-
tial to the vitality of interspousal tort suits. See Comment, supra note 78, at 298-99.
81. For an example of one such interspousal tort case, see Mogford v. Mogford, 616
S.W.2d 936, 939-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
82. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
83. Id. §2.
84. Id. §14.
85. Id. § 6(c)(4).
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Compensation Act. If court costs in criminal cases for assaults on
spouses were the only available funds, the funding would probably
be grossly inadequate because of our inability to identify such
cases. But if the base of such funding were expanded to include the
costs of suits resulting from the whole range of assaultive conduct,
such funds could provide at least elementary support for abuse vic-
tims. Funding questions are basic to such proposals since the use
of tax revenues may be politically impractical. The use of court
costs is expedient because it places the burden of compensation on
those committing the crime.
The philosophy that applauds funding by court costs would
undoubtedly abhor one potential use of the compensating funds.
Compensation paid to a victim should not be shared by the perpe-
trator of the assault. This possibility is, however, very real, espe-
cially if the abuser and victim are still married. Nickerson v. Nick-
erson provided a partial solution by characterizing the
compensating funds as the separate property of the victim.80 But
no absolute assurance exists that the abuser will not benefit, di-
rectly or indirectly, from the compensation. This result is inevita-
ble, and must be accepted as part of the price paid for assuring
assistance to the victim.
Courts have often cited collusion between spouses as a reason
for denying interspousal tort suits,87 and this argument would
surely be renewed if a compensated victim continued to live with
an assailant. The prohibition on this arrangement in the current
Act 88 reflects this concern. The only effective method of reducing
the potential for collusion is to require the victim to divorce the
assailant before compensating that victim. If, as the courts seem to
believe, society is interested in maintaining the marriage regardless
of its success, such a provision would prove unacceptable.
Procedural safeguards to prevent the improper application of
the assistance could surely be found. For example, the compensa-
tion could take the form of direct payments for hospital and medi-
cal expenses, thus avoiding misappropriation of the funds by the
abuser. Using funds to provide desperately needed counseling and
vocational services would benefit only the victim. Similarly, pro-
viding shelter facilities and emergency food and clothing for abuse
86. 65 Tex. 281, 285 (1886).
87. IV. PROSSER, supra note 65, § 122.
88. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(c)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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victims would not assist the spouse abuser directly.
Private and public compensation schemes are the frontier of
civil legal alternatives for abuse victims. Compensation does not
relate to prevention or retribution in a philosophical sense, but it
does extend the legal relief available to abuse victims.
B. Criminal Prosecution
An abuse victim may choose criminal prosecution, the second
major available legal alternative. Unlike civil actions, prosecution
is public in nature and depends largely upon those administering
the various aspects of the criminal justice system for its
effectiveness.
1. Substantive Law. The Texas Penal Code defines a variety
of crimes against the person, many of which are applicable to
abuse situations.8 9 These include homicide,90 assaults,91 threats 2
and harassment,93 and sexual abuse or rape. 4 The Code distin-
guishes between crimes by reference to culpability and the method
of committing the assault. 5
The wide latitude of assaultive conduct recognized by the
Texas assault statutes provides ample opportunity for prosecution
of even the most minor injury.9 6 Even threats to cause bodily in-
89. See generally TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5 (Vernon 1974).
90. Id. § 19.01.
91. Id. § 22.01.
92. Refer to text accompanying notes 122-23 infra.
93. See Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 411, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Sere. 2204 (Vernon)
(amending TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a), (b) (Vernon 1974)) (relating to written or
telephoned harassment).
94. Sexual abuse or rape of a spouse has not been a criminal offense in Texas. TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.02, 21.04 (Vernon 1974). But recently passed legislation criminalizes
spousal rape when a divorce action is pending or the spouses do not reside together. Act of
June 19, 1983, ch. 977, § 3, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5311 (Vernon) (to be codified at Tsx.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011, 22.021).
95. Id. § 22.02(c). Homicide and assault, the most serious physical forms of abuse, are
punished by reference to aggravating factors, one of which is culpability. See generally id.
§§ 19.01-.07. Culpability, under Texas law, is defined by circumstances. To kill another
knowingly or intentionally is murder. Id. § 19.01(a). However, if the victim provoked the
assailant, giving adequate cause for an act of passion, the crime is manslaughter. Id. §
19.04(a). Under this statutory scheme, a homicide may be classified as anything from crimi-
nally negligent homicide to murder, depending on the method of commission and the mens
rea accompanying the act. Id. §§ 19.02, 19.07. Similarly, assault punishments range from a
small fine to felony sentences. Id. §§ 19.02(a)(1), 22.01(a)(3).
96. See generally id. §§ 22.01-.08. For example, reckless infliction of bodily injury suf-
fices for class A misdemeanor assault. Id. § 22.01(a)(1).
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jury constitute an assault,97 as do, of course, threats of a more seri-
ous nature 5 Written or telephone harassment may also be subject
to criminal prosecution if it is impermissibly annoying or alarming
to the recipient.99
Community property law plays havoc with criminal prosecu-
tion for destruction or damage of the property of one spouse by
another. Since most property crimes require that the interference
with property be committed without the effective consent of the
owner, prosecution of a spouse for damage or destruction of prop-
erty in which the actor has a community interest presents serious
difficulties. 100
If one looks no further than to the substantive law, the tools
available to law enforcement should have long ago reduced the
problem of spouse abuse to insignificance. Since this is manifestly
not the case, and since such laws have generally been available for
a considerable time, one may surmise that the deterrence value of
these measures is low. Deterrence is not, however, improved by
simply increasing the penalties for abuse related offenses or segre-
gating spouse abuse as a specific crime.
Some states do consider spouse abuse a separate criminal of-
fense.10 1 The penalties in these states range from misdemeanor to
felony and precondition their application on proof of various phys-
ical abuses. 1 2 One of the oldest such laws is the California statute
which has been in effect since 1945.103 The California approach has
97. "Bodily injury" includes physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical con-
dition. Id. § 1.07(a)(7).
98. Id. § 22.07(a)(2).
99. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 411, § 1, 1983 Ter. Sess. Law Serv. 2204 (Vernon)
(amending Tax PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a), (b) (Vernon 1974)).
100. Section 28.05 of the Penal Code attempts to remove this impediment by statuto-
rily denying the defense that the actor has an interest in the property damaged or destroyed
if another person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe. Tam PENAL
CODE ANN. § 28.05 (Vernon 1974). Unfortunately, this section pertains only to Chapter 28 of
the Code, and deals with damage or destruction exclusively. It is doubtful that such a provi-
sion is of much use when one spouse wants to harm the other by destroying community
belongings, since the police would be placed in the untenable position of trying to determine
the ownership interest of the defendant in the property and the ratio that such interest
bears to the total value. Id. § 28.06. It is by determination of such values that the serious-
ness of the crime is assessed in Texas. Even if law enforcement officials were willing to
accept such a task, the undesirability of allowing them to do so is evident.
101. See generally J. HAmos, STATE Doms'ric VmoLrNcF LAws AN How ro PAss THEm
37 (1st ed. 1980); Comment, supra note 67, at 427.
102. J. HAMos, supra note 101, at 36-37.
103. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1983). One commentator on the deterrent
value of the California approach has found little to engender hope:
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hinged upon one spouse (originally the husband) causing a "trau-
matic condition" in the other by reason of abuse. 10 4 The courts in-
terpreted this language to mean that bruises or other signs of
abuse must be visible. 105 The problems of proof in such a require-
ment are obvious and deny the comprehensive coverage desirable
in any such legislation.110
To date, Texas has avoided recognition of spouse abuse or
family violence as a distinct crime,1 07 preferring to maintain these
prosecutions as if the parties were strangers. In 1979, the Texas
Legislature did, however, reinforce the applicability of the assault
statutes to domestic violence by amending the laws to include the
phrase, "including his spouse," in the basic assault language.108
The legislature also added changes to the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure that require police to protect those threatened by abuse.100
Despite their shortcomings, criminal sanctions remain an es-
sential weapon in the arsenal against spouse abuse. They undenia-
bly deter some abuse and contain the potential to deter more. The
severity of the punishment is not paramount; rather, the availabil-
As an attempt to overcome these non-interventionist policies California has made
spouse abuse a specific statutory felony. Despite the codification of spouse abuse
as a specific felony, however, California's criminal law remedy for victims of abuse
appears vulnerable to police and judicial conciliatory tactics. Particularly, judges
remain reluctant to sentence an abusive husband, a predisposition exaggerated by
the legal requirement of establishing a "traumatic condition" from evidence that
rapidly disappears. Statistics reiterate the dilemma faced by abused spouses.
Since fewer than one in six felony arrests for wife or child beatings results in
conviction and the incidence of familial violence remains high, the statute has lit-
tle deterrent effect. Thus statutorily proscribing spouse abuse appears an imper-
fect solution to the problem.
Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 156-57.
104. A person in California is guilty of a felony if he "willfully inflicts upon his or her
spouse . . . corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition." CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5
(West Supp. 1983).
105. People v. Burns, 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 873-74, 200 P.2d 134, 137-38 (1948).
106. Speaking of the California statute, one writer observed: "The statute is in force,
but its application presents some problems which have yet to be resolved. Physical injuries
still must be present, but many husbands are adept at hitting their wives in places where
bruises will not show." Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 199.
107. Although the Texas Family Protection Act initially included wording suggesting
that it may be a crime to violate a protective order, the original statute never actually made
the violation criminal. TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 3.58(e) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). Violation
is now criminal. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 631, § 3, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4049 (Vernon)
(to be codified at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08).
108. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).




ity of the substantive law, knowledge of its existence, and the law's
swift and decisive application act as the most powerful deterrents.
The strength of the criminal law remedy to abuse is determined by
its availability in substantive form, the practical use of that law by
police, the prosecution of violations, and the judicial disposition of
such cases.
2. Police Involvement. Police officers are the first representa-
tives of society to become involved in spouse abuse.110 In Texas,
police officers have a statutory duty to prevent a "threatened in-
jury"111 by taking action whenever an injury to a spouse or another
is about to occur. 112 Statutory duties do not, however, describe the
role played by police in abuse cases. To understand this interac-
tion, one must consider the factors of circumstance, experience,
and training that the police officer brings to an abuse call.
One such factor is the police officer's knowledge that he is
about to become involved in one of the most dangerous situations
in police work. Nationwide, nearly twenty percent of police deaths
in the line of duty are attributable to domestic disturbance calls,
and the number of fatalities among Texas officers is nearly as
high.1 3 Knowing the danger attached to these calls, the police
might be expected to answer such calls slowly, giving the situation
time to subside and, hopefully, resolve itself before their arrival. 1'
Nevertheless, police response times do not appear to reflect wide-
spread apathy or avoidance.
1 15
Once on the scene, the police officer may opt to reconcile the
couple, thereby avoiding escalation of the situation or increased
danger to the officer. If the officer is skilled in mediation, this con-
ciliatory tactic may prove satisfactory. As the skill of the officer or
the willingness of the abuser to be reconciled decreases, the likeli-
hood of successful mediation also diminishes.
Arrest is often the only alternative to mediation. A recent
study by Sarah Berk and Donileen Loseke assessed the determina-
tive factors in the arrest decision and yielded interesting results.1
110. Berk & Loseke, supra note 36, at 318.
ill. TX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 6.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
112. Id. art. 6.06.
113. Trent, supra note 63, at 12; Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 185; Com-
ment, supra note 67, at 424.
114. Berk & Loseke, supra note 36, at 335.
115. M. SCHULMAN, supra note 24, at 40.
116. Berk & Loseke, supra note 36, at 329.
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The authors found four variables that produced statistically signif-
icant effects. 117 The most important of these factors was whether
the victim would sign a "citizen's arrest" warrant for the police.118
While this procedural device is not used in Texas, many agencies
employ the complaint form. For more serious cases, police depart-
ments may use sworn statements indicating that prosecution is
desired.
Berk and Loseke also found that when both principals were
present and the female alleged violence or the male had been
drinking the probability of arrest rose.""9 The female's allegation of
violence produced a far higher incidence of arrest than did allega-
tions of property damage or the mere presence of both principals
at the scene when the police arrived. 121 It may be supposed that
appeal to the protective instincts of the responding officer, taken
with the continued possibility of abuse, resulted in the increased
chances for arrest. Once the damage was done, the inclination to
arrest declined, suggesting that police may also see criminal action
as far more retributive than protective. When alcohol was in use
and the principals remained on the premises, arrest was more
likely.12'
The fourth important factor in deciding whether or not to ar-
rest seems to have a contradictory effect. If a female abuse victim
alerts the police to the situation, arrest probability decreases by
nearly twenty-one percent. 21 One may speculate that the reason
for the diminished arrest rate is the belief that someone able to
call for assistance is not so seriously in trouble as someone for
whom help must be summoned. 2 '
Until recently, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure pro-
117. Id. at 338. The four variables are "citizen's arrest," "female calls police," "both
principals present x male drinking," and "both principals present x female only alleges vio-
lence." Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 339.
120. Id.
121. Id. Berk and Loseke characterized the significance of this statistic in the follow.
ing way:
Not only does intoxication suggest the continued volatility of the situation, and
thus no immediate solution to the disturbance, but it may also lead to a more
convenient arrest charge (e.g., resisting or assaulting an officer) as an alternative
to a charge of spouse abuse.
Id.




scribed virtually all warrantless misdemeanor arrests for offenses
not committed within the view or presence of the arresting of-
ficer. 124 Warrantless felony arrests are permissible,125 but felony of-
fenses, particularly aggravated assaults, occur with far less fre-
quency than misdemeanor assaults.
The Texas Legislature amended article 14.03 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure during its 1981 session.128 The amendment
permits a peace officer to make a warrantless arrest when probable
cause exists to believe that the suspect committed an assault re-
sulting in bodily injury to another person and that immediate dan-
ger of further bodily injury to that person exists.2 7
The approach of the statute is two-pronged, but the second
prong is unresponsive to the realities of abuse. Abuse cases will
rarely present a police officer with any difficulty in establishing
probable cause to believe an assault resulting in bodily injury has
occurred. The obstacle to application of this arrest power will come
from the required probable cause to believe that immediate danger
of further bodily injury exists.
A police officer responding to a domestic dispute in which the
assault is over before his arrival may find the abuser has
temporarily fled the scene. In this event, immediate danger of fur-
ther injury is gone with the attacker. Similarly, if the abuser is still
present when the officer arrives but denies any intention of contin-
uing the abuse, facts may not exist to warrant an arrest.
A better procedural solution is found in statutes like the
Washington one, s which omits the "immediate danger" require-
ment and permits warrantless arrests upon a showing of "physical
harm or threats of harm to any person or property.' 2 If police
inaction inhibits implementation of the full deterrence of criminal
law, that problem will not be relieved by proscribing arrests in
124. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01 (Vernon 1977).
125. Id. art. 14.03 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
126. Id., amended by Act of June 11, 1981, ch. 442, § 1, 1981 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1865 (Vernon).
127. TEX. CODE CRM. PROC. ANN. art. 1403 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). This kind of
statute recently withstood an attack on equal protection grounds in Florida. LeBlanc v.
State, 382 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1980).
128. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.31.100(1) (Supp. 1983-1984). The Washington provision
states: "Any police officer having probable cause to believe that a person has committed or
is committing a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor, involving physical harm or threats of




most situations and permitting it in only a few others.
To optimize the role of law enforcement in violent domestic
situations, law enforcement agencies need to initiate certain proce-
dural improvements. These improvements should include estab-
lishing a "good faith" defense for assault arrests involving family
violence, increasing communication between social service agencies
and law enforcement, establishing police data collection criteria for
abuse cases, and developing police as a source of information for
abuse victims. Added to expanded arrest capabilities and crisis in-
tervention training, implementation of these measures would en-
hance the ability of law enforcement officials to control the spouse
abuse problem.
Despite the recently expanded warrantless arrest proce-
dures,130 police remain reluctant to arrest. Officers' concern that an
arrest of one family member at the request of another will lead to a
false arrest or malicious prosecution suit against the officers con-
tributes to this reluctance.
Victims often promise to pursue prosecution while the officer
is present but then refuse to prosecute a few hours later. Knowing
this, and realizing the vulnerability of his position as the outsider
in this triangle, the officer has no illusions about the final loyalties
of the complainant. With this in mind, and confronted with what
is often an.invisible injury to the victim, the officer may choose to
ignore his statutory duty and avoid arrest, regardless of his sympa-
thies.131 Texas lawmakers should, therefore, consider establishing a
"good faith" defense for police officers enforcing assault laws
against persons in the domestic setting. Such laws have been
passed in other states to allay fears of civil liability for reasonable,
good faith arrests of abusers.'32
Since the police are usually the first to learn of abuse cases,
and are often the only agency to deal with the problem, logically
recordkeeping should begin at that level. Currently, most police
departments do not segregate records of domestic violence from
other forms of assault. 3 3 Since many calls for assistance do not
result in legal action, it is also vital for meaningful statistical col-
130. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.03 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
131. Comment, supra note 67, at 427.
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-134.3 (Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310 (1979). See
Lerman, Expansion of Arrest Power: A Key to Effective Intervention, 7 VT. L. REv. 59, 68
(1982).
133. J. HAMOS, supra note 101, at 7.
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lection that information about such calls be kept in a form permit-
ting easy retrieval and comparison. Police departments rarely keep
such records.3
This kind of information-gathering would assist problem solv-
ing only if it conformed to strict collection and dissemination crite-
ria. Individual police departments should send data to a central
state agency responsible for such statistical compilation and evalu-
ation so that data may be fed back to the reporting agencies or
those involved in planning within the systems concerned with
abuse."3 5 This central agency should release information only in
statistical form to criminal justice, judicial, or social agencies for
planning purposes.
The method of collection and dissemination of data must in-
clude measures to protect the privacy of the abuse victim. The leg-
islature should enact express exemptions to the Open Records
Act s13  to assure the privacy of abuse victims. This cannot, of
course, prevent divulgence of the name of a complainant in a crim-
inal case to the defendant or his attorney, but could curtail the
present public accessibility of such information.
Police should be aware of what social service agencies are
available and should refer victims to these resources. That rarely
happens; however, when it does, it depends solely upon the indus-
triousness of the individual officer. Clearly, the only efficient
method of establishing this link between police and noncriminal
justice resources lies with the agencies. From the practical stand-
point, these social services must carry the responsibility of making
themselves known to the police.
Several states have enacted legislation requiring police to fur-
nish certain information to abuse victims. 3 7 This typically includes
an outline of possible civil and criminal remedies, along with some
statement of the officer's duties in providing medical assistance or
protection. 38
The most common proposal for police education of abuse vic-
tims involves requiring officers to pass out cards containing statu-
134. Id.
135. The Domestic Violence Assistance Act proposed in the U.S. Senate in 1978 pro-
vided such a central clearinghouse of information within the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare. S. 2759, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CoNG. Rc. 23,633 (1978).
136. Tax. Rlv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).




torily defined information. 139 This procedure is attractive in several
respects. First, it places the burden of dissemination on the group
most likely to recognize abuse situations and to whom victims most
often may be expected to turn for assistance. Second, giving this
task to police raises their level of recognition of the problem and
affords them the means of helping the victim. Finally, informing
the victim about the duties of the police leaves officers little room
for avoidance of their responsibilities in the abuse situation.
3. The Prosecutorial Role. The prosecutor should answer le-
gal questions from abuse victims. In some cities prosecutors have
developed programs stressing the importance of abuse cases.
140
Specifically, the prosecution of abuse has been given priority in Se-
attle, Washington; Santa Barbara, California; Los Angeles, Califor-
nia; and Westchester County, New York.14 1 While the specific
methods employed differ, the approaches used by each of these
agencies alter the traditional methods of handling abuse and show
that improved prosecution is possible.
Rather than filing abuse cases in the same way as other as-
saults, these innovative programs require that spousal assaults re-
ceive special attention. The prosecutors screen the cases initially to
determine whether the victim will cooperate; then the extent and
history of the assaultive behavior and the legal sufficiency of the
case are examined. 141 Special handling of abuse cases does not nec-
essarily lead to acceptance of more cases for already burdened
caseloads. It does, however, permit the rejection of cases at an ear-
lier stage when it is clear that prosecution is undesirable or unsuit-
able.14 3 The prosecutor should explain legal options to complain-
ants at the same time he is evaluating victim cooperation. If the
139. Lerman, Criminal Prosecution of Wife Beaters, RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN THE
FAMILY, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 19; Trent, supra note 63, at 14. The police should only be re-
quired to provide information about the location and availability of legal assistance, medical
care, shelter, and counseling services. Providing legal advice on a three-by-five card may
mislead and potentially injure the victim. Information about the police role should be very
general to retain flexibility in the police response; the police should not he bound to the
black-and-white rules of arbitrary, printed instructions. Handled properly, the police-issued
information card is a practical way to apprise victims of their recourse; it should not at-
tempt to answer all of their questions.







prosecutor rejects the case, the complainant will understand better
the deficiencies that led to the decision and be less likely to give up
on the legal system. If a case survives the screening process, the
complainant will also understand better what testimony is ex-
pected from the victim, how long the case will take to be tried, the
punishment possibilities, and other legal alternatives to the prob-
lem. This screening process results in stronger cases for the prose-
cutor as well as prepared and willing complainants. Conviction
rates would undoubtedly improve after such screening. Further-
more, persons whose cases were rejected would be less frustrated
and might turn to appropriate social services for assistance.
Without care, overly aggressive prosecution can become insen-
sitive prosecution and can be as damaging to the victim as the re-
fusal to treat abuse seriously. For this reason, district and county
attorneys should, if possible, assign specific investigators or prose-
cutors to handle spouse abuse cases. These people should be aware
of the community resources available to victims and be available to
assist in training police in this work. Even when it is impractical to
assign specific personnel to work exclusively on abuse, these cases
should not be handled routinely by every prosecutor on the staff or
erratically assigned to the inexperienced members of the office. If
the criminal justice system treats the prosecution of abuse as a pri-
ority, other segments of society may someday view it as a priority
as well.
C. Dispositional Alternatives
Spousal assaults resemble any assault in the substantive sense,
but one cannot equate the sanctions for family violence with socie-
tal needs in the prosecution of other crimes. 44 For the family unit
to survive a criminal prosecution, the judge must recognize the im-
pact a jail sentence will have. For example, if the defendant is the
family breadwinner, confinement will punish the whole family by
cutting off its source of income. This problem increases if the de-
fendant loses his job as a result of the confinement. In this regard,
imposition of a fine is less damaging to the family in the long run,
although the immediate impact may be just as devastating.
But the disadvantages of incarceration do not mean that the
judge should exclude it as a possible sanction in every case that
144. For a contrary view, see Trent, supra note 63, at 21.
1983] 1305
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
economic detriment might occur.1"5 In many such cases, the judge
can sentence defendants to a county work-release program that en-
ables the prisoner to attend his job during the day and return to a
minimum security jail at night and during weekends. 14" This ap-
proach demonstrates to the prisoner the willingness of the court to
order confinement while it recognizes the needs of the family and
the responsibility of the offender to continue support.
Judges often prefer probation to incarceration because of the
nature of the crime, the potential damage to the defendant and the
overcrowding of jails. Unfortunately, if defendants routinely re-
ceive probation in abuse cases without consideration of the needs
of the defendant and victim, probation may be worse than no pun-
ishment at all. Probation without conditions is a dangerous encour-
agement to further abuse. Instead, courts should work to condition
probation if it is granted. The sentence should require the defen-
dant to attend alcohol or drug abuse counseling, 147 spouse abuse
counseling, or other counseling for problems contributing to the
abuse. The court might also require the defendant to compensate
the victim of the crime or pay for medical expenses incurred as a
result of the assault,14 8 and it should expressly prohibit further
abuse.
The supervision of an abuser should begin long before sen-
tencing. Conditioning pretrial release on terms like those fre-
quently found in a temporary restraining order is one way to offer
some protection to the victim. 149 While only a few states have
passed specific statutes permitting judges to establish such condi-
tions for release, 150 judges generally have broad discretion in this
145. Id.
146. Statutory work release is now possible in Texas for offenses punishable by con-
finement in a county jail or third degree felonies. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 586, § 4, 1983
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3792 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. CODE CaM. Pnoc. ANN. art.
42.03, § 6). Unfortunately, the amendment is of little practical use in abuse situations be.
cause it requires a jury finding that the defendant did not cause a bodily injury. Id. County
work release statutes do provide that money earned by a prisoner be paid to the victim
through the sheriff for support and restitution, an ideal scheme in abuse cases. Id. § 1 (to be
codified at Tax. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 42.03, § 6).
147. The magistrate setting bond may now require participation in a drug or alcohol
abuse program as a condition of release. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 551, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 3206 (Vernon) (to be codified at Tax. CODE CraM. PROc. ANN. art. 17.40); id. § 2
(to be codified at TEx. CODE CrM. PRoc ANN. art. 22.021).
148. Tax. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 42.12, § 6(m) (Vernon 1979).
149. Lerman, supra note 139, at 10; Comment, Wife Beating, supra note 6, at 192.
150. See Lerman, supra note 139, at 10. Under a new Texas law, probation officers
may develop pretrial release programs and diversionary programs. Act of June 19, 1983, ch.
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area. To reinforce and facilitate such measures, Texas needs spe-
cific statutory authorization for courts to condition the release of
prisoners in spousal abuse cases on terms designed, at least, to pro-
tect victims from further abuse pending trial. For greater effective-
ness, such a statute should also permit conditioning release on par-
ticipation in rehabilitative programs. As a concomitant feature, the
court might be permitted to divert the offender and eventually dis-
miss the case upon a showing of successful completion of a rehabil-
itative program. 151
All of the methods suggested, from the pretrial stage to the
sentencing stage, are tools of the court, prosecutor, and even the
defense attorney. Working in the adversarial system, such diverse
options can promote the punishment or rehabilitation of abusers
while offering protection to victims.
D. Protective Orders
In 1979, the Texas Legislature established a separate civil pro-
cedure specifically dealing with some of the more common
problems of abuse. This addition to the Family Code 5 2 made pro-
tective orders, a form of injunctive relief, available for family vio-
lence situations when no divorce is pending. In adopting this mea-
sure, the legislature followed a national trend that has seen all but
six states pass similar protective order statutes.1 3
These statutes attempt to fill the void between divorce and
other civil or criminal remedies for family violence. Although the
details of the acts differ from state to state, most are essentially
equitable in nature and merely codify the right of a person to ob-
tain an injunction and certain ancillary relief where a divorce is
762, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4572 (Vernon) (amending Tm. OE Ca. PRoc. ANN.
art. 42.12, § 10(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)).
151. Besides work release, refer to note 145 supra, Texas law contains an additional
applicable sentencing alternative. When alcohol has contributed to the abuse, as is often the
case when an arrest has been made, misdemeanor judges, including municipal court judges,
may remand a defendant to an authorized alcohol treatment facility for up to 90 days in lieu
of imposition of sentence. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5561c, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1982-
1983). This limited device lies dormant, waiting for application in appropriate cases, many
of which are abuse-related. Its application should be expanded to include treatment of other
contributory problems linked with abuse. This kind of treatment vehicle vwould go a long
way toward eliminating the systemic reluctance to punish abusers.
152. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.01-.19 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
153. Lerman, State Legislation on Domestic Violence, REsPONSE TO Vz0L.NCE IN TH
FAMnLy, Aug.-Sept. 1980, at 1.
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undesirable. 154 These acts make long-overdue attempts to deal spe-
cifically with abuse.
Under Title IV of the Texas Family Code, any member of a
"family" or "household" is eligible to apply for protective orders. 155
This expansive approach includes anyone related by consanguinity
or affinity including former spouses, foster children and parents,
and persons living together in the same dwelling, even if unre-
lated. 1516 The broad scope of eligibility greatly enhances the effec-
tiveness of this measure by eliminating unrealistic restrictions.
In states limiting the eligibility for protective orders to mar-
ried adults, many single cohabitants or former spouses suffer abuse
without the same recourse afforded married persons. In Texas,
framing the statute to include all such combinations not only recti-
fied the harshness of narrow limitations, but avoided problematical
interpretations of the common-law marriage status.
The inclusion of former spouses, children, parents, or even
strangers living together in a single household appropriately ad-
dresses the variety of interpersonal assaultive conduct that de-
stroys the lives of cohabiting groups. If such groups are the fabric
of modern society, whether or not they resemble the traditional
family unit, society's interests dictate the same protection to them
that is accorded spouses.
A related concern is whether any person other than the victim
of abuse may apply for relief. The Texas statute permits filing of
an application by any adult member of a family or household for
the protection of the filing adult or any other member of the fam-
ily or household, including a child member. 57 This provision ap-
plies even if the person filing the application no longer lives in the
same household as the alleged abuser. 58 While this procedure ob-
viously benefits abused children and adult victims who are hospi-
talized, in hiding, or physically or financially incapable of filing for
themselves, it also benefits those who are simply unsure of their
154. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.01-.19 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (protection
of the family).
155. Id. § 71.01(b)(3), (4).
156. Id.
157. Id. § 71.04(b), amended by Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 2, 1983 Tox. Sess. Law
Serv. 3857 (Vernon). An application may be filed for a child by any adult, whether or not a
member of the household. Id. § 71.04(b)(2). The recent amendments to the Act allow any
prosecuting attorney in the county court to file for protective orders for any person alleged
to be the victim of family violence. Id. (to be codified at id. § 71.04(b)(3)).
158. Id. § 71.04(c).
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desire to pursue a legal remedy. In this respect, Texas law is more
accommodating than that of many states."'
But, prior to the recent amendment of the Texas Family
Code,160 protective orders did not accommodate the class of vic-
tims who were in the process of obtaining a divorce. If the appli-
cant filed for divorce, any application for a protective order was
dismissed."6" To further this prohibition, every application re-
quired a statement that no suit for dissolution of the marriage was
pending.16 2 Lawmakers apparently considered temporary orders
adequate protection for parties in a pending divorce. Virtually no
other state shared this position with Texas,"' and the logic of this
provision was not apparent. If a protective order was in effect
before the divorce action was filed, there was no need to duplicate
in the divorce court what had already been accomplished by the
protective order. On a more elementary level, it seems unnecessary
to have required an abuse victim to pay twice for the same result.
The former Texas concept forced the applicant to choose between
continued protection without pursuing divorce and vulnerability
until divorce was granted.
Continued protection was also lacking when divorce was the
first step. If the victim wanted protection during the pendency of
the divorce, he obtained a temporary injunction which, in turn,
was replaced with a protective order after the divorce was final.
The Texas Legislature amended the statute in 1983 to resolve
this problem.'" Under the current statutory scheme, a petitioner
may request a protective order in the divorce court during pen-
159. Lerman, supra note 153, at 4-7.
160. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 631, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4046 (Vernon) (to be
codified at TEx. F m. CODE ANN. § 3.581) (making protective orders available to a party
seeking divorce upon motion as part of divorce action); Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 4,
1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3859 (Vernon) (amending Tax. FA. CODE ANN. § 71.06 (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983)) (making applications for protective orders available to parties if filed
before filing divorce action); id. § 5 (amending TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.13(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983)) (making conflicting orders of court with jurisdiction over divorce or an-
nulment proceedings prevail over conflicting orders of court with jurisdiction over parties in
divorce suit-as in an application for a protective order filed prior to divorce proceed-
ings-only to the extent of actual conflict).
161. T7X. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.06 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), amended by Act of June
19, 1983, cl. 607, § 4, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3859 (Vernon).
162. TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 71.05(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
163. Lerman, supra note 153, at 4-5.
164. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 631, § 1, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4046 (Vernon) (to be
codified at TEx FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.581).
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dency of the marriage dissolution.165 Such an order remains valid
until the court vacates or dismisses the suit or orders a final decree
of divorce. 6 If a conflict arises between an order of the divorce
court and any existing protective order, the order obtained in the
court dissolving the marriage prevails.1
6 7
Unfortunately, this amendment perpetuates, in part, the judi-
cial inefficiency of the original statute. By terminating the protec-
tive order upon finality of the divorce or annulment decree, the law
cuts off continued protection at a time when it may be needed
most. The divorced abuse victim must then either initiate suit for
another protective order or accept the risk that a former spouse
will continue to be abusive."6" It would be far more effective to per-
mit the divorce court to choose whether to terminate a protective
order. The statute will remain procedurally deficient until this
change is made.
A protective statute may limit the types of abuse covered as
well as the eligibility of applicants. Since the primary objective of
the protective order is to prevent "family violence" as defined in
the statute,' 69 the statute should avoid over-restrictive definitions
of violent behavior.
The Texas statute addresses only the "intentional" use of
physical force. Lesser degrees of culpability are apparently beyond
the scope of the protective order in Texas. 170 Similarly,
"threatened" abuse is a form of "family violence" but "attempted"
abuse is not.177 Nor is every form of sexual abuse of a child or
adult within the statutory definition, since "physical force" is the
determinative factor under the provision as now written.7 2 These
anomalies might not have existed had the statute borrowed the
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 5, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3859 (Vernon)
(amending TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.13(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)).
168. Apparently, if the protective order is sought in a separate action prior to divorce
proceedings, and no conflicting order is entered by the divorce court, then the protective
order will not terminate upon finality of the divorce or annulment unless the court with
jurisdiction over the separate action frames the order so to terminate. Id. § 4 (amending
Tsx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.06 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)) (making applications for protective
orders available to parties if filed before filing divorce action).






concept of "bodily injury" from the Texas Penal Code17 3 to supple-
ment the "physical force" requirement. For instance, if the statute
also prohibited the infliction or attempted infliction of bodily in-
jury, the emphasis on the result as well as the means would have
permitted broader interpretation of proscribed acts.
To protect a victim from further abuse, the court must antici-
pate the ways the abuser might inflict physical or psychological
mistreatment and shape its relief to avoid such a possiblity. The
abuser may try to circumvent the intent of the court's order by
obeying the literal words of the order but imaginatively employing
means calculated to continue the abuse. In its effort to prevent
such circumvention, the court may use its past experience to ad-
vantage. Specifically, Texas law permits the court to prohibit the
abuser from directly or indirectly communicating with the appli-
cant or going to or near the residence, place of employment, or any
other place where the applicant may be.174 These measures usually
work well in divorce cases and should prove broad enough to deal
with the harassment that often accompanies physical abuse.
A vital part of the relief available is granting exclusive use of
the family domicile to one of the parties. 1  The Texas statute con-
templates diverse living situations and permits such orders
whether the residence is jointly owned or leased by the parties,
owned or leased by the party granted possession, or owned or
leased by the party denied possession if that party has a child sup-
port obligation."'
The court may augment the award of exclusive possession of
the domicile by an order granting use and possession of any other
specific community or jointly owned property to one of the par-
ties17 7 and prohibiting the transfer of such property by the parties
during the pendency of the protective order.17 8 This measure is
173. See Tam PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(7) (Vernon 1974).
174. Tax. FM.. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(1)(B), (C) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (to be re-
codified at id. § 71.11(b)(2), (3)).
175. Id. § 71.11(a)(2).
176. Id. § 71.11(a)(2)(A)-(C).
177. Id. § 71.11(a)(6). This provision is especially important for at least two reasons.
First, the victim of abuse has enough problems without having to find another place to live.
If the applicant retains custody of children during the period covered by the protective
order, the interests of the children are often best served by allowing them to remain with
the parent in possession of the family residence. Second, the abuser rightly bears the
financial and physical burden of a new residence.
178. Id. § 71.11(a)(1)(E) (to be recodified at id. § 71.11(a)(1)(B)).
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often useful to prevent the kind of retaliatory actions associated
with divorce and may assist in apportioning the property according
to need.
Merely awarding an applicant the domicile and specific items
of property, however, is not always sufficient. 1 7 If the abuser is not
required to provide sufficient financial support to pay for necessi-
ties and housing, many applicants may be deterred from asking the
court to order the removal of the abuser. The Texas statute per-
mits support payments for a party or child of a party if an obliga-
tion to provide support exists.180
Although this support provision does not apply to unmarried
cohabitants, it contributes measurably toward the continued shel-
ter and feeding of many victims. This approach may be preferable
to an order to pay only the rent or house payment since it is broad
enough to accommodate those victims who want to move from
their former domicile and live in a new residence or in an abuse
shelter.
In addition to making support and property awards, the court
may require counseling with a social worker, family service agency,
physician, psychologist, or other qualified person.181 Statutory pro-
visions, however, do not require that fees for this treatment be
paid by the abuser. Perhaps lawmakers considered such payments
self-defeating, since the money would often come from community
funds. The court should, however, be empowered to deal with each
case individually, especially since no community fund impediment
exists when the abuser and victim are not married.
Further, the Texas support provisions do not compensate the
victim for damages resulting from the abuse. While the victim may
bring a collateral suit for damages against the abuser, judicial effi-
ciency would be increased if the court awarded compensation at
the same time that it issued protective orders. The abuser should
compensate the victim for medical care, lost wages, counseling, or
other expenses without regard to the marital status or support ob-
ligation of the parties. 82 With the abrogation of interspousal tort
immunity in Texas, the victim of abuse is entitled to compensation
for the results of intentional torts committed by the attacker. 183
179. See, e.g., Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 162.
180. TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 71.11(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
181. Id. § 71.11(a)(5).
182. J. HAMOS, supra note 101, at 23.
183. Refer to notes 82-88 supra and accompanying text.
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Clearly, courts should settle this claim in the most expeditious and
judicially economical manner possible.
The Texas act does not allow the court to order the abuser to
pay court costs or attorney's fees.184 The availability of attorney's
fees for successful claimants under the Texas Crime Victims Com-
pensation Act highlights the inequity of this limitation."8 5 If the
state must repay costs and fees, surely a private party should bear
this responsibility when there is evidence of wrongdoing. The ef-
fect of the Texas act's failure to provide for such recovery is the
effective denial of relief to those unable to pay. 86
Finally, in a broad grant of equitable power, a Texas court
may prohibit specific acts by an abuser to prevent or reduce the
likelihood of further family violence. 87 Proper use of this provision
may anticipate and deter specific violent, threatening, or harassing
conduct.
Protective orders have been available in Texas for over four
years, but, like tort actions, there have been relatively few applica-
tions for this remedy. One explanation for the limited use of this
protective device may be the lack of procedural effectiveness and
efficiency inherent in the legislation.
Requiring formality in a petition seeking damages in major
business litigation probably does not affect the availability of such
relief, while the same formality required in a petition for protective
orders could effectively preclude availability of the remedy to those
it is intended to help. 88 Not all abuse victims are unable to pay for
representation, but it is obvious that many victims of abuse will be
unable to finance even the least expensive kinds of assistance. Al-
though pro se filing of applications for protective orders is permit-
ted under the Texas statute, 89 an abuse victim acting pro se will
184. Many other states provide such relief. Lerman, supra note 153, at 4-5.
185. Tm REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
186. If a prosecuting attorney obtains a protective order for the victim, the abuser
may be ordered to pay costs and attorney's fees to the government, but costs and fees re-
main unavailable for private practitioners. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 2, 1983 Teax. Ses3.
Law Serv. 3858 (Vernon) (to be codified at T. F s. CODE ANN. § 71.04(e)). Note that filing
fees or other court costs may be waived for an applicant other than a prosecuting attorney
upon a showing that the applicant is upable to pay. Id. (amending Tax. FAL COD ANN. §
71.04(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)). Refer to notes 194-96 infra and accompanying text.
187. Tax. FArs. Conm ANN. § 71.11(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
188. Lerman, Civil Protection Orders: Obtaining Access to Court, 3 RaseoNs To Vi.
oLENCri THE FALY Apr. 1980, at 1.
189. Tam FAm. CODE ANN. § 71.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), amended by Act of June
19, 1983, ch. 607, § 3, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3858 (Vernon).
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have difficulty invoking the equitable power of the court and un-
derstanding and selecting suitable relief under the law.' 00 The
Texas liw governing application for protective orders has estab-
lished clear and relatively uncomplicated requirements. 1 ' Consid-
ering the rather limited relief options available,9 2 form applica-
tions should suffice at least to initiate an action.
Other states have aided applicants for protective orders by
preparing form petitions, requiring court clerks to assist applicants
with filing, and advising victims of their right to such relief at the
police and prosecutorial levels. 193 Form petitions do not, of course,
eliminate the need for competent professional representation in
these proceedings. Nevertheless, the use of form applications and
orders should reduce the cost of legal assistance since legal fees
depend on the amount of work required in a specific case.
Tacitly acknowledging this cost factor, the legislature origi-
nally set the filing fee for protective orders at sixteen dollars.
9 4
This effort was praiseworthy but inadequate to accomplish its pur-
pose. The legislature amended the fee provision in 1983 to permit
waiver of filing fees and costs upon a showing of inability to pay.1
Further, an applicant is entitled to a hearing on indigency within
three days of the filing of a request for waiver of fees and costs,
eliminating much of the potential for delay in a waiver
procedure. 96
Providing legal assistance for those unable to pay may be more
important than alleviating costs. If the legislature does not sim-
plify the application or authorize clerical assistance from the court,
some form of professional help is essential. Legal Aid or other
forms of free clinical assistance are vastly overburdened. 9 While
such assistance might eventually become available, it would proba-
bly come too late to meet the more immediate needs of serious
190. See Lerman, supra note 188, at 1.
191. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), amended by Act of June
19, 1983, ch. 607, § 3, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3858 (Vernon).
192. Id. § 71.11, amended by Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 631, § 2, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 4047 (Vernon). Refer to text accompanying notes 200-20 infra.
193. See Lerman, supra note 188, at 1; Lerman, supra note 153, at 6-7.
194. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.04(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), amended by Act of
June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 2, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3858 (Vernon).
195. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 2, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3858 (Vernon)
(amending TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.04(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)).
196. Id.
197. Lerman, supra note 188, at 1.
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abuse victims. The overcrowding of free legal services testifies elo-
quently to the need for such services. Since there is little chance
that court-appointed attorneys will become routine in civil cases in
the near future, only one apparent alternative remains. The prose-
cutor who represents the victim in the criminal abuse case should
also handle the protective order. 98 No doubt prosecutors would
oppose the addition of protective orders to their already heavy
workload, but no other alternative appears to protect the rights of
the victim. It makes economic sense to spend part of the
prosecutorial budget on protective orders, since these orders
should reduce the criminal caseload of spousal assaults.
The 1983 Texas Family Code amendments facilitate
prosecutorial involvement. Specifically, a prosecuting attorney may
file an application for a protective order and recover attorney's fees
payable to the fund from which salaries are paid to prosecutors.1 1
The 1983 amendments greatly improve the potential availabil-
ity of protective orders, but until the problems of filing applica-
tions, paying court costs, and making representation available are
resolved in favor of the victim, the Texas statute is effective only
for those most likely to have the entire range of civil and criminal
remedies already at their disposal. When the procedural require-
ments for protective orders become as simple and inexpensive as
those for peace bonds, protective orders will assume the same role
with much greater potential benefit to the applicants.
1. Ex Parte and Emergency Relief. The effectiveness of a
protective device rests upon the speed and ease with which an ap-
plicant can obtain it, and Texas law only partially meets that test.
The Texas statute does not permit emergency orders to be issued
at times when courts are typically not in session. If the offender is
arrested, there are still no guarantees that the abuser will not be
released on bond before the victim can obtain any temporary or-
ders or other protection.
The applicant can obtain emergency orders if there is a "clear
198. Id.
199. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 607, § 2, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3858 (Vernon) (to be
codified at T. FAm. CODE ANN. § 71.04(b)(3), (e)). Regarding which prosecuting attorneya
may file on behalf of an applicant, the amendments allow any prosecuting attorney to file
"who serves the county in which the application is to be filed and who represents the state
in a district or county court for the protection of any person alleged to be a victim of family
violence." Id. (to be codified at T. Fii. CODE ANN. § 71.04(b)(3)).
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and present danger" of family violence, and the court may issue
such orders ex parte.200 The application must contain facts con-
cerning the violence and the need for immediate protective orders,
and it must be verified under oath by the applicant, a process simi-
lar to that of application for a temporary restraining order in a
divorce.0 1
Unfortunately, the law fails to specify a method for having an
emergency order granted on weekends or holidays, late at night, or
when the court is not sitting. While some populous counties in
Texas may have judges willing to be contacted at home to issue
such orders, many districts have only one judge serving many
counties, and he may not be available for several days.
If the victim does obtain an ex parte order, it is valid for only
twenty days, 0 2 though it may be extended on the motion of the
applicant or on the court's own motion for further twenty-day pe-
riods as necessary.20 3 This procedure may possibly violate due pro-
cess because it potentially deprives the respondent of property for
an indefinite time without a hearing. The respondent must file a
motion to vacate an ex parte order to bring the matter to a hearing
on the merits.04 This places the burden of setting the case for
hearing on the respondent, which may cause injury if the respon-
dent is unable for some reason to file such a motion.
2. Duration of Orders. When the court has heard the appli-
cation for a protective order, it may enter an order granting relief
for any period up to one year.205 Any party or the court itself may
move to modify in any respect, except to extend the order's dura-
tion.20 6 Although a second protective order is presumably available
to an applicant immediately upon the expiration of the first, the
first order terminates by operation of law.20 7 This relieves the par-
ties of the need to move for termination of the order. In addition,
the police and other agencies involved in the enforcement of the
order can quickly determine the termination date even if no date
appears in the court's order.
200. Tx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.15(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
201. Id. § 71.05(e).
202. Id. § 71.15(b).
203. Id. § 71.15(c).
204. Id. § 71.15(e).
205. Id. § 71.13(a).
206. Id. § 71.14.
207. See id. §§ 71.13-.14.
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3. Enforcement. Enforcement of the protective order is es-
sential. If there is no swift and sure method of punishing violations
of the order, it is unlikely to deter abusers. The two principal
methods of enforcing such orders are contempt and criminal sanc-
tion. The drafters of the Texas statute obviously attempted to in-
corporate both approaches, but without success.
The Texas law specifically requires that the following language
be included in every protective order and that it appear in bold-
face type or capital letters:
A person who violates this order may be punished for contempt of
court by a fine of as much as $500 or by confinement in jail for as
long as six months, or both."'8
Although this kind of warning is unusual, the idea is meritorious
because the written threat of punishment is a constant and clear
reminder to the person restrained.
Contempt alone is insufficient to enforce protective orders for
the same reasons discussed in connection with restraining orders
and temporary injunctions. 00 The mere availability of contempt as
an enforcement tool may even diminish punishment for violations.
If a protective order is in effect and the violator commits an act
that would otherwise be a felony or class A misdemeanor assault,
the court will be reluctant to prosecute if it can opt for contempt
proceedings. Unfortunately, the most serious punishment pre-
scribed for criminal contempt is far less than that prescribed for
any but the least serious assault. 10
A contempt hearing may be scheduled weeks after the viola-
tion and has many of the attendant disadvantages of a criminal
trial. Delays in contempt proceedings substantially increase a risk
of continued violence. Additionally, prior to the 1983 amendment,
Texas law did not empower police agencies to arrest for violation
of a protective order.2"" Some states resolved this problem by mak-
ing violations indirect criminal contempt for which police may
208. Id. § 71.16(a).
209. Refer to notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
210. See Eisenberg & Seymour, An Overview of Legal Remedies for Battered Women,
Tmsi, Aug. 1979, at 28, 29. Compare Tax Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1911 (Vernon 1964)
(district courts may punish for contempt by fine not to exceed $100 and by imprisonment
not to exceed three days) with Tm. PEAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
(classifying some assaults as class C misdemeanors) and Tax PEa, CoDE ANN. § 12.23
(Vernon 1974) (class C misdemeanor punishable by fine not to exceed $200).
211. Refer to notes 214-19 infra and accompanying text.
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make a warrantless arrest.1 2 In Pennsylvania, the offense need not
occur in the presence of the police and there is no right to trial by
jury for the violation. 3
The old Texas statute attempted to involve police agencies in
the enforcement of protective orders in an unusual way. The law
required, in addition to the language warning of contempt penal-
ties, that each protective order contain the following wording:
A violation of this order by commission of family violence may be
a criminal offense punishable by a fine of as much as $2,000 or by
confinement in jail for as long as one year, or both.
214
This wording created confusion concerning the legislative intent.
The language did not create a crime because it merely implied that
the conduct was criminal. It was also possible to interpret the
warning of criminal prosecution as simply a restatement of the
possible penalties for assault existing in the Texas Penal Code. If
so, this caveat was seriously inaccurate because it described only
one misdemeanor assault penalty range when other misdemeanor
or felony assaults might be involved. 5 This tacit degrading of all
levels of assault to a lesser penalty range misled the very person it
meant to deter.
Finally, in 1983, the legislature amended the penal code by ad-
ding a provision specifically criminalizing the intentional or know-
ing violation of a protective order.21 The offense entails an act of
family violence, direct communication with a member of the family
or household in a threatening or harassing manner, or presence at
or near the residence or place of employment in violation of a pro-
tective order. 17 Any of these violations of the protective order is
punishable as a class B misdemeanor, 1 8 and the offender remains
subject to prosecution for any crime committed while violating the
order.219
This change in the law clarifies the language required in the
212. Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 163.
213. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10190(a), (c) (Purdon Supp. 1983). See also
Comment, Spouse Abuse, supra note 6, at 163.
214. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (emphasis added).
215. See Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (allowing some
assaults to be tried as felonies).
216. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 631, § 3, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4049 (Vernon) (to be
codified at TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08).
217. Id. (to be codified at Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08(a)(1)-(3)).
218. Id. (to be codified at TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08(d)).
219. Id. (to be codified at TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08(c)).
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protective order, but it has a far more important function. It
finally provides police the statutory authorization to arrest those
who violate a protective order rather than relegating enforcement
to contempt proceedings. Whether police agencies will increase en-
forcement in abuse cases because of this amendment remains to be
seen, but the law is now procedurally complete.
The Texas law instituting protective orders already had one
necessary predicate to unsupervised enforcement by the police.
The statute required all municipal police departments and sheriffs
to establish procedures to insure that officers have access to the
names of persons protected by such orders.2 20 This requirement
heightened police sensitivity to abuse cases and insured the availa-
bility of vital information to the officer in the field. Procedures en-
abling officers to contact judges or court personnel supervising pro-
tective orders would improve this data flow. Judges are commonly
called upon to set bonds and arraign prisoners at inconvenient
times; only slight additional attention is needed to provide the ju-
dicial supervision necessary to enforce these orders.
IV. CONCLUSION
The primary purposes of legal remedies to spouse abuse
should be deterrence, protection, and compensation, in that order.
In achieving these goals, no single alternative examined provides
completely effective relief.
To be effective, the chosen remedy must also be readily availa-
ble. Therefore, procedure must complement the substantive goals
of any legal mechanism designed to aid victims or combat abuse.
Although laws requiring numerous hearings, service of citation, for-
mal pleadings, and professional counseling may further desirable
goals, they also nullify the remedy for many abuse victims who
cannot afford such procedures. While not every remedy need be
available to every victim, every victim should have access to suffi-
cient and comprehensive relief from abuse. That goal is far from
being realized.
The goals of economy and effectiveness suggest that priorities
should be assigned to abuse remedies. If possible, the law should
deter the potential abuser, and this focus must remain primary.
Where deterrence fails, as it must in some cases, effective protec-
220. TE). F . CODE ANN. § 71.18 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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tion of the potential victim becomes paramount. If law and society
fail in these goals, compensatory and rehabilitative measures must
be available. The essential challenge is to provide legal systems
that are both effective and accessible.
Each remedial alternative bearing upon spouse abuse should
be strengthened, but particular attention should be paid to afford-
ing quick, sure, and readily available legal assistance to the vast
number of people affected by abuse. It is hard to imagine any
larger class of victims in such urgent need who have traditionally
received so little assistance from the law. The Family Protection
Act recognized that need in Texas, but one simple legislative
stroke cannot resolve a problem of the proportions of spouse
abuse.
